RESUMO: A POLÍTICA DA AÇÃO REGULATÓRIA: responsabilização, credibilidade e delegação
“Indivíduos racionais podem escolher limitar suas próprias escolhas no futuro antecipando seu próprio comportamento irracional ou miópico. (…) Essa irracionalidade pode assumir a forma de paixões políticas ou de limitações na forma como os indivíduos fazem escolhas intertemporais. Os incentivos do mercado político levam os atores políticos a utilizarem-se de uma alta taxa de desconto ao comparar benefícios futuros com benefícios presentes. Assim, em virtude da estrutura de incentivos em que operam, legisladores racionais são levados a preferir benefícios menores no curto prazo a benefícios maiores no longo prazo” (MELLO, 2001. p. 63).
“O isolamento — ou “insulamento” — burocrático dessas elites asseguraria a prevalência da racionalidade técnica sobre a racionalidade política, evitando-se assim a “balcanização do Estado” (MELLO, 2001. p. 61).
THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY ACTION: accountability, credibility and delegation
By Cristiano Bodart
Marcus André Melo search, first, to discuss the regulatory agencies as the institutional form: its evolution and recent creation. Later discusses the tension between delegation and accountability that underlies the creation of independent agencies.
To him independent regulatory institutions are the centerpieces of economic management and its impact on macroeconomic performance and welfare of citizens is directly linked to them.
The author discusses the delegation of autonomy to regulatory agencies as rational choice of rulers, in a globalized economic environment, in order to gain credibility.
Melo identifies four modes of regulatory action in the economy, they are: a) public ownership of firms or sectors of the economy, b) the exercise of regulatory activities directly by departments or agencies of the executive bureaucracy, c) the various forms self-regulation through corporatist arrangements and d) public regulation with private property, typically American, based on a peculiar institutional form: the regulatory agency endowed with nontrivial degrees of autonomy.
To explain what causes the legislature to adopt bureaucratic insulation appropriates the Rational Choice Theory.
For him the legislature is aware that its renewal will depend on whether or not the position of their decisions and their performance in office. Thus, there is an incentive to act in the interests of voters. However, voters do not hold any information relevant to assessing the performance of their representatives, so this will tend to get better results, even if you have to give up shares in time to yield positive results in the medium term, which often means give some degree of isolation of the bureaucracies.
“Rational Individuals may choose to limit their own choices in the future by anticipating their own irrational or myopic behavior. (…) This irrationality may take the form of political passions or limitations on how individuals make intertemporal choices. The incentives of the political market lead political actors to use is a high discount rate to compare future benefits with present benefits. Thus, because of the incentive structure in which they operate, rational legislators are led to prefer lower benefits in the short term the greatest benefit in the long period “(Mello, 2001. p. 63).
For Lee, the project of streamlining the bureaucracy culminates in a project of delegating substantive decisions “, removing the influences of short-term political actions, since they provide all the constraints of the” electoral connection “or competition policy would lead to fiscal irresponsibility and a “populist macroeconomic policy.”
“Isolation – or” isolation “- these bureaucratic elites ensure the prevalence of technical rationality on political rationality, thus avoiding the” balkanization of the state “(Mello, 2001. P. 61).
Melo to “the ability of insulation of the bureaucratic elites in relation to new short-term pressures of electoral dynamics and interest groups was considered as a central strategy for successful experiences of structural reforms and stabilization programs.” Clearly, there are criticisms to this stance, for example, the democratic deficit